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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREG NORTON, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs 
J. RALPH MACFARLANE, M.D., 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 880248 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on an Interlocutory-
Appeal from an Order of the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Weber County, State of Utah, by the Honorable David E. 
Roth, District Judge, denying the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which 
Relief Can be Granted (defendant's "Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I: SHOULD THE UTAH SUPREME COURT JOIN THE MAINSTREAM OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT OF ALIENATION OF 
AFFECTIONS, AN ACT CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S OPINION IN 
HACKFORD V. UTAH POWER & LIGHT AND WITH THE LEGISLATURE'S 
ADOPTION OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AS A GROUND FOR NO-FAULT 
DIVORCES? 
II: SHOULD THE UTAH SUPREME COURT JOIN THE MAINSTREAM OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT OF CRIMINAL 
CONVERSATION, A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT IS EVEN MORE SUBJECT TO 
ABUSE AND TO YIELDING IRRATIONAL RESULTS THAN ALIENATION OF 
AFFECTIONS? 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
30-2-4. Wife's right to wages-Actions for personal 
injury. 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal 
labor, maintain an action therefor in her own name and 
hold the same in her own right, and may prosecute and 
defend all actions for the preservation and protection 
of her rights and property as if unmarried. There 
shall be no right of recovery by the husband on 
account of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or 
for expenses connected therewith, but the wife may 
recover against a third person for such injury or 
wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall include 
expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid 
or assumed by the husband. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-4 (1984)(emphasis added). 
30-3-1. Procedure - Residence - Grounds. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the 
marriage: 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-1(3) (Supp. 1988)(emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Amended Complaint in this case alleges that 
(1) the defendant alienated the affections of the plaintiffs 
wife away from the defendant and (2) the defendant committed 
-2-
the tort of criminal conversation by engaging in sexual 
relations with the plaintiff's spouse. The Amended Complaint 
seeks $200,000.00 in compensatory damages for the plaintiff's 
alleged "emotional distress, mental anguish, embarrassment, 
loss of the services and consortium of his wife," and child 
care expenses, along with $200,000.00 in punitive damages based 
on an allegation of malice. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
The original Complaint in this case contained three 
causes of action. Record, at 1. The defendant brought a Rule 
12(f) Motion to Strike, Record at 9, and the plaintiff amended 
his Complaint to include only the two causes of action for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation, Record at 
39, whereupon the motion to strike was denied. Record at 65. 
Next, the defendant filed his Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. 
Record at 70. After extensive briefing, the defendant's motion 
was argued before Judge David E. Roth, who issued a ruling 
denying the motion on the grounds that he was bound by Utah 
Supreme Court precedent to recognize the continued existence of 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions. 
Record at 148. A final order denying the defendant's Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was filed on June 9, 1988. The 
defendant submitted his Petition for Permission to Appeal from 
an Interlocutory Order by the Second Judicial District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah, Denying the Defendant's Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon 
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Which Relief Can Be Granted on June 28, 1988. Record at 196. 
On August 1, 1988, the Utah Supreme Court granted that 
Petition, and this appeal followed. Proceedings in the 
District Court were stayed by order of Judge Roth as of August 
10, 1988, Record at 193, pursuant to a motion by the defendant 
Record at 184. No answer has been filed to date in this case. 
Statement of Facts 
No facts have been developed in this case, except the 
fact that the plaintiff is suing the defendant under the 
theories of alienation of affections and criminal conversation 
with specific claims of damages and prayers for relief as 
discussed above. There are, of course, factual allegations in 
the Complaint, but no answer has been filed, and therefore, no 
facts have been admitted, denied, or otherwise determined. 
Since this is an appeal from a denied Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 
defendant-appellant recognizes his burden of showing that the 
amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted even if all of the allegations contained therein 
were assumed to be true for purposes of argument. This appeal, 
therefore, presents a pure question of law as to whether, in 
the abstract, causes of action for alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation ought to exist in Utah. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant seeks the abolition of the torts of 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation in Utah. 
Alienation of affections is a judicially-created tort 
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that derives from the obsolete view that a husband owns his 
wife. Modern attempts to find a rationale for the tort's 
continued viability have been largely devoid of meaningful 
content. The tort lacks a cohesive and defensible public 
policy basis that is consistent with the rest of the body of 
Utah law. 
Many public policy considerations strongly favor the 
tort's abolition. First, and foremost, the tort treats the 
so-called "alienated spouse" as a piece of furniture and not a 
human being. The tort assumes that the "alienated spouse" is 
incapable of freely choosing upon whom to bestow his or her 
affections, and the tort denies the "alienated spouse's" right 
to pursue happiness. Second, alienation of affections actions 
have no deterrent effect. Third, it is exceptionally difficult 
to accurately determine damages in alienation of affections 
cases. Fourth, alienation of affections lawsuits are often 
brought or threatened for blackmail purposes. Fifth, 
alienation of affections lawsuits are often brought for the 
improper purpose of injuring the "alienated spouse" by 
attacking somebody who is emotionally close to that 
individual. Sixth, alienation of affections actions are 
entirely inconsistent with this court's recent decision in 
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co. prohibiting loss of 
consortium damages. Finally, abolishing this archaic tort 
would put Utah within the mainstream of American legal 
thinking. Viewed collectively, these policy considerations 
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make a compelling argument in favor of abolishing the tort of 
alienation of affections in Utah. 
The judicially-created tort of criminal conversation 
is even more deserving of abolition than alienation of 
affections. It is plagued with almost all of the defects of 
alienation of affections. In addition, criminal conversation 
is a virtually strict liability tort, which has led to absurd 
results in practice. Not surprisingly, criminal conversation 
has been even more roundly rejected than alienation of 
affections by the mainstream legal community. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD JOIN THE MAINSTREAM 
OF AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT 
OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS, AN ACT CONSISTENT 
WITH THE COURT'S OPINION IN HACKFORD V. UTAH 
POWER & LIGHT AND WITH THE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION 
OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AS A GROUND FOR 
NO-FAULT DIVORCES. 
A. Alienation of affections is a judicially 
created tort in Utah, with no constitutional 
or statutory basis, which may therefore be 
judicially abolished. 
In Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954), 
the Utah Supreme Court defined "the essential allegations of 
the cause of action for alienation of affections" as: 
(a) the fact of marriage, (b) that the 
defendant willfully and intentionally, (c) 
alienated the wife's affections (d) 
resulting in the loss of the comfort, 
society, and consortium of the wife, and (e) 
(to justify punitive damages) a charge of 
malice. 
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Wilson, 267 P.2d at 763. In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court declared that "the right to 
recover for alienation of affections now extends to both 
spouses equally," Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1215, and added the 
following two "clarifications and elaborations": 
First, the requirement that the defendant's 
acts must have constituted the 'controlling 
cause' of the alienation of affections means 
that the causal effect of the defendant's 
conduct must have outweighed the combined 
effect of all other causes, including the 
conduct of the plaintiff's spouse and the 
alienated spouse. For this purpose, a 
defendant is properly chargeable with the 
effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures 
of the alienated spouse where the defendant 
knows or has reason to know that such 
acquiescence will damage the marital 
relationship. 
Second, in trying to make the damages 
•proportionate' to the loss of the injured 
spouse, the trier of fact should consider 
the duration and quality of the marriage 
relation, including the extent to which 
genuine feelings of love and affections 
existed between the spouses prior to the 
intervention of the defendant. 
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1219. 
The Nelson court also provided guidance concerning 
punitive damages in alienation of affections actions. The 
court stated that in order to meet the prerequisite showing of 
malice, "the plaintiff must show 'circumstances of aggravation 
in addition to the malice implied by law from the conduct of 
-7-
defendant in causing the separation of plaintiff and [his or 
her spouse] which was necessary to sustain recovery of 
compensatory damages.'" Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1219 (brackets in 
original) (quoting Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C.App. 521, 527, 265 
S.E.2d 434, 438 (1980)). Furthermore, any award of punitive 
damages must take into consideration a number of factors, 
including evidence of the defendant's net worth or income. Id. 
There is no constitutional provision or statute that 
authorizes or requires the recognition of alienation of 
affections as a cause of action in Utah. 
Because alienation of affections is a judicially 
created cause of action, without any constitutional or 
statutory support, it may be judicially abolished. When 
Washington became the first state to judicially abolish the 
tort, it made the following observations: 
The action for alienation of a spouse's 
affections is a judicially created doctrine 
in this state. The action existed at common 
law, and was adopted into the jurisprudence 
of this state. See, e.g., Beach v. Brown, 
20 Wash. 266, 55 P. 46 (1898). The 
legislature of this state has not 
specifically provided for an action for 
alienation of affections. 
No doubt has ever been expressed regarding 
the courts' power to abolish this judicially 
created action for alienation of a spouse's 
affections. Our original decision in this 
case recognized that 'a rule of law which 
has its origins in the common law and which 
has not been specifically enacted by the 
legislature may be modified or abolished by 
the courts when such revision is mandated by 
changed conditions.' In the instant case, 
-8-
the question of abolition of the action has 
been squarely presented to the courts of 
this state and, since the action was created 
judicially, the courts have the power to 
resolve this question. 
Wvman v. Wallace, 94 Wash.2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 453-454 (1980) 
(citations omitted). 
Beyond having the power to abolish alienation of 
affections, this Court has an obligation as the guardian of the 
common law to reexamine the continued viability of a tort that 
this Court recently called "a historical anomaly." Hackford v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286 n.3 (Utah 1987). 
If alienation of affections is no longer supported by a solid 
theoretical foundation, or if public policy considerations 
favor abolition of the tort, then the tort ought to be 
abolished. The strength of our common law tradition is 
dependent upon the judiciary's constant pruning of obsolete 
notions and legal theories to create a healthier and more just 
body of law. 
B. Alienation of affections is a tort derived 
from the archaic and unacceptable notion 
that a wife is the property of her husband. 
The history of the tort of alienation of affections 
was admirably traced in Justice Durham's detailed concurring 
and dissenting opinion in Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1223-1227. 
Originally, the tort was derived from the notion that under the 
medieval concept of social status, when a woman married she 
lost her legal and spiritual existence as an individual, 
-9-
becoming instead a part of her husband and one of his 
chattels. As one modern commentator put it: 
Early courts were exclusively 
controlled by men, and the origin of 
alienation of affections must necessarily be 
considered with that in mind. At common 
law, a wife was more than a "mere chattel;" 
she was a man's most prized possession. 
Therefore, enticing away a man's wife was 
perhaps the ultimate tort. 
Comment, Alienation of Affections: Flourishing Anachronism, 13 
Wake Forest L.Rev. 585-588 (1977). The concept that a wife has 
no separate legal identity and is merely the property of her 
husband is entirely inconsistent with modern legal thinking. 
That point was admitted by the majority in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
and the majority put forth the following as an acceptable 
modern rationale for the tort: 
While the archaic notion of "wife as 
chattel" may have served as the historical 
foundation for this cause of action, its 
modern context bears little resemblance to 
that notion. The right to recover for 
alienation of affections now extends to both 
spouses equally. See, e.g., Heist v. Heist, 
46 N.C.App. 521, 265 S.E.2d 434 (1980); 
Burch v. Goodson, 85 Kan. 86, 116 P.2d 216 
(1911). Moreover, an action for alienation 
of affections is no longer based on the 
premise that either spouse constitutes the 
"property" of the other, but on the premise 
that each spouse has a valuable interest in 
the marriage relationship, including its 
intimacy, companionship, support, duties, 
and affection. Note, "The Case for 
Retention of Causes of Action for 
Intentional Interference with the Marital 
Relationship", 48 Notre Dame Law, 426 430-31 
(1972). 
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Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1215 (emphasis in the 
original). Interestingly, Nelson is the first Utah case to 
make the tort of alienation of affections available to both 
spouses, Wilson v. Oldroyd talks specifically in terms of 
alienation of "the wife's affections." Wilson, 267 P.2d at 763. 
In Nelson, the majority opinion, by rejecting the 
existing historical "wife as chattel" basis for the tort, in 
effect created a new tort based on the asserted "valuable 
interest in the marriage relationship". Nelson 669 P.2d at 
1215 (emphasis in the original). As the next section of this 
brief demonstrates, although that justification may be facially 
appealing, it is fatally flawed. 
C. The rationalization that "each spouse has a 
valuable interest in the marriage 
relationship" is inaccurate when considered 
in light of Utah law. 
The statement by the majority in Nelson v. Jacobsen 
that "each spouse has a valuable interest in the marriage 
relationship , including its intimacy, companionship, support, 
duties and affection" may seem at first glance appealing. If 
the statement is true as a general matter of Utah law, then 
alienation of affections actions simply connote one of many 
possible ways in which that incorporeal interest may be 
invaded, leading to liability. In effect, alienation of a 
spouse's affections would simply be a means by which the tort 
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of interfering with a party's marriage relationship might be 
conducted. 
The problem with the foregoing theory is that there is 
no general tort of "interference with the marriage 
relationship" under Utah law. If there is, and if each spouse 
truly has a generally protectable interest in the marriage 
relationship itself, then any wrongful act that damages the 
marriage relationship should be actionable, provided that basic 
tests of causal proximity can be met. Thus, a wide range of 
injuries to spouse "A" should result in a cause of action in 
favor of spouse "B" for the harm caused to spouse "B's" 
interest in the marriage relationship. For example, if 
Defendant negligently injures Husband in a car accident, then 
Wife ought to be able to sue Defendant for his negligent 
interference with her interest in her marriage relationship 
with Husband. It is reasonably foreseeable that when a 
defendant negligently causes a car accident, the defendant may 
injure somebody else, and that the injured party may be 
married, and that the injuries may damage the injured party's 
spouse's marriage relationship. Thus, causality is established. 
Under Utah law, however, an action by Wife to recover 
for the harm to her marriage (and in particular its "intimacy, 
companionship, support, duties, and affection," to quote 
Nelson) caused by Defendant's negligent injury of Husband in a 
car accident would be deemed a suit for loss of consortium 
damages. Loss of consortium actions are explicitly barred by 
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this courts very recent decision in Hackford v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987). 
Countless other examples could be given, but the 
foregoing demonstrates that there is no general legally 
cognizable and protectable interest in the marriage 
relationship as such under Utah law. Indeed, under all of Utah 
law there appear to be only two conditions where the alleged 
"interest in the marriage relationship" is legally 
enforceable. One area is in wrongful death cases, as provided 
by Article XVI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution; the other 
area is in alienation of affections and/or criminal 
conversation actions. 
The majority in Nelson, therefore, could not have been 
referring to a generally protected "interest in the marriage 
relationship," since no such interest exists; rather, they were 
referring to a purported interest in each spouse not to have 
the marriage relationship disrupted by the attempts of third 
parties to alienate the affections of the other spouse. 
Phrased that way, however, the rationale supporting Nelson v. 
Jacobsen turns out to be a tautology. In effect, Nelson says 
that there should be a cause of action for alienation of 
affections because each spouse in a marriage has a right not to 
have the other spouse's affections alienated. Such reasoning 
does not provide a sound analytical basis for the continued 
existence of a cause of action that has been widely rejected by 
the majority of American jurisdictions. 
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D. The tort of alienation of affections ignores 
the "alienated spouse's" status as a human 
being who should be free to change his or 
her own emotions and affections. 
Our Declaration of Independence contains these words, 
which form the core of America's concept of jurisprudence: "We 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness." The Declaration of Independence, para. 
2 (U.S. 1776). Those unalienable rights extend to the key 
non-party figure in alienation of affections actions, the 
so-called "alienated spouse." Merely because a couple is 
married does not give one spouse the right to hold the other 
spouse's emotions hostage, or to prevent the other spouse from 
achieving a state of happiness. Yet that is precisely the 
effect of alienation of affections actions. The very existence 
of the tort means that a spouse must conscientiously avoid 
relationships that could expand the spouse's horizons in a way 
that might damage the marriage relationship, even at the 
expense of the spouse's own happiness. Otherwise, the other 
participant in the relationship may become a defendant in an 
alienation of affections lawsuit. 
One essential point to remember is that alienation of 
affections actions have nothing to do with sex or sexual 
relationships per se. Rather, the tort lies in all cases where 
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the defendant is aware of the existence of the marriage, and 
yet willfully and intentionally alienates the plaintiff's 
spouse's affections away from the plaintiff. Wilson, 267 P.2d 
at 763. Even the "intentional and willful" standard is not 
hard and fast since "a defendant is properly chargeable with 
the effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures of the 
alienated spouse where the defendant knows or has reason to 
know that such acquiescence will damage the marital 
relationship." Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1219. 
Thus, alienation of affections actions can arise in 
many anomalous and unfair situations. For example, an 
individual's parents, who bore and raised that individual as a 
child, clearly have at least as much of an interest in the 
affections of an individual as that individual's spouse. Yet 
if, for example, spouse "A's" parents and spouse "B" fervently 
hate each other, with the result that spouse "A" eventually 
divorces spouse "B," spouse "B" can sue spouse "A's" parents 
for alienating spouse "A's" affections. Poulos v. Poulos, 351 
Mass. 603, 222 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1967). But cf. Bradford v. 
Bradford, 165 Or. 297, 107 P.2d 106, 109 (1940) (recognizing a 
parental privilege to act in good faith for the best interest 
of the child). Of course, the law recognizes no parallel cause 
of action in "A's" parents if, as a result of their bickering 
with spouse "B," spouse "B" chooses to move the family across 
the country from the parents-in-law and pressures spouse "A" 
into ostracizing spouse "A's" parents. 
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There are also situations in which an individual may 
attempt to intentionally alienate a spouse in order to protect 
that spouse. Our courts and newspapers are full of tragic 
stories where an abused spouse (almost invariably the wife) 
refused to believe that she should leave her husband until 
finally great physical injury or death had occurred. Often the 
physical injury extends beyond the abused spouse to the 
couple's children. Yet, a social worker who sets out to 
disillusion the wife of the notion that she and her children 
somehow deserve to be beaten, undoubtedly knows and intends 
that his or her actions may lead to divorce or separation. 
Under such a set of circumstances, the social worker who is 
trying to prevent serious injury to mother and children has 
committed the tort of alienation of affections under existing 
Utah law. Nor is the problem unique to social workers; 
ministers, professors, friends, anybody who is aware that by 
their actions they may change an individual's perception of the 
world, and who desire that result even though it may have 
adverse impact on the individual's marriage, is a proper target 
for an alienation of affections lawsuit. For example, while 
decisions involving ministers have recognized a general 
religious privilege, see Radecki v. Shuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 
92, 361 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1976), courts also find that the 
privilege does not cover cases that have crossed the fine line 
between acceptable religious zeal and an improper motive. See 
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing 
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cause of action against minister who advised wife to leave her 
husband and who harassed the family publicly); Bear v. Reformed 
Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (1975) (use of 
shunning can constitute alienation of affections); Carrieri v. 
Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d. 132, 136-137 (1966). 
Even allowing alienation of affections actions in the 
more stereotypical case—where a third person develops an 
emotional or romantic bond with a spouse, thereby damaging the 
spouse's marriage—denies the emotional independence of that 
spouse. The tort presupposes that the "alienated spouse" is 
incapable of exercising his or her free will in determining to 
whom he or she will direct emotional or romantic energies. As 
Justice Stewart correctly pointed out in his opinion in Nelson: 
We do not live in a day, if ever there 
were one, when male or female Casanovas cast 
a spell that all but nullifies the willpower 
of a member of the opposite sex. Persons 
who have been married do not generally fall 
prey to overwhelmingly seductive powers of 
another like some inert piece of iron drawn 
inexorably into the ever stronger field of 
power of a magnet. The affection of the 
married persons for each other is usually 
alienated by their own conduct or misconduct, 
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1222 (Stewart J. concurring and 
dissenting). If marriage is no longer meeting the emotional 
needs of one spouse, and that spouse desires to find emotional 
and romantic comfort elsewhere, a lawsuit for alienation of 
affections will do nothing to restore the weak marriage, but 
will only interfere with the "alienated spouse's" new found 
happiness. 
-17-
E. The analogy sometimes drawn between 
alienation of affections actions and 
interference with contractual relationships, 
or prospective economic relationships, is 
inaccurate. 
A common defense of alienation of affections as a tort 
is that it is really very similar to such well recognized torts 
as interference with contractual relationships and interference 
with prospective economic relationships. Actually, alienation 
of affections is very different from those torts. 
The tort of interference with a contractual 
relationship arises, by definition, out of a contract. In a 
normal contract, each contracting party is bound to do 
specified acts, and neither party may unilaterally terminate 
those commitments. Liability for interference with a 
contractual relationship occurs when a third party 
intentionally induces one of the contracting parties to breach 
the contract. The third party's liability is derived from, and 
directly connected with, the inherent liability of the party 
that breached the contract. 
In a marriage, by contrast, the spouses have very 
limited legal obligations to each other. Neither spouse is 
legally obliged to give any comfort, to or have any affection 
for, the other spouse. A spouse cannot sue in court to force 
the other spouse to give affection, or to pay damages for the 
lack of affection. Yet alienation of affections holds a third 
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party liable for inducing a spouse to stop giving the comfort 
and affection that the spouse was never legally obligated to 
give. Unlike interference with a contractual relationship, 
where both the inducer and the actor (breaching party) are 
equally liable, in alienation of affections the inducer is held 
liable while the actor (the alienated spouse who has withheld 
affection) is not liable for his or her actions. 
Not only is the analogy between alienation of 
affections and interference with the contractual relationship 
invalid, the analogy between marriage itself and a contractual 
relationship, once quite valid, is no longer so today. Even 
the term "marriage contract," which implies a legal right to 
enforce the continued existence of a marital relationship, is 
no longer accurate. When the Utah Legislature adopted the 
concept of no-fault divorces in 1987, it rejected the notion 
that a spouse has an enforceable property right in the 
continued existence of his or her marriage. 
Historically the "marriage contract" was recognized as 
being so strong that early divorces were very difficult to 
obtain. The plaintiff was required to show that the defendant 
had breached the marriage vows first, by some fault of the 
defendant's, before the plaintiff could be released from his or 
her further marital obligations to the defendant. Otherwise, 
the defendant had a right to the continued existence of the 
marital relationship. A court could only terminate the marital 
relationship upon a finding that the defendant had "breached" 
the "marriage contract." 
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The concept of fault as a requisite for divorce, and 
the corresponding concept of the defendant's right to prevent 
the divorce from taking place by showing that there had been no 
fault, continued in theory in Utah law until the passage of the 
Grounds for Divorce Law of 1987. Chapter 106, Laws of Utah 
1987 (now codified as Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-1(3)(h)(Supp. 
1988)). Although the grounds for divorce had been 
progressively relaxed over the years, until that law was passed 
it was still technically possible for a defendant to prevent a 
divorce by claiming that he or she had not committed any acts 
of physical or mental cruelty (to use the most common example) 
and that the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to a 
divorce. In theory, if the defendant treated the plaintiff 
with kindness and had not committed any act that gave rise to a 
ground for divorce, the plaintiff could not obtain the divorce, 
even if the plaintiff despised the defendant. 
The introduction of no-fault divorces substantially 
changed the nature of the marriage relationship in Utah. By 
allowing a divorce on the "grounds" of irreconcilable 
differences, the legislature allowed the plaintiff to terminate 
the marriage regardless of the fault or behavior of the 
defendant. It is impossible to defend against a charge of 
irreconcilable differences; the mere act of denying the 
allegation in an answer constitutes proof of the irreconcilable 
nature of the differences between the parties. A system of 
divorce law based on irreconcilable differences eliminates the 
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right of one spouse to insist on the continuation of the 
"marital contract" so long as that spouse does nothing to 
breach it. 
The marital relationship has gone from one of binding 
contract to one of a gift freely given, which may be freely 
withdrawn. There is no cause of action for interference with a 
prospective gift or for causing the failure of the giftee to 
give the gift; there should no longer be an action for 
alienation of affections. 
If marriage resembles any sort of a contract, it is 
most similar to a contract that is terminable at will. There 
is no cause of action for merely inducing a party to an "at 
will" contract to legally terminate, rather than breach, that 
contract. Since a spouse can legally terminate his or her 
affection for another spouse at any time, there should be no 
cause of action for inducing a spouse to do so. 
The analogy between alienation of affections actions 
and the tort of interference with a prospective economic 
relationship is even more far fetched than the analogy to the 
tort of interference with a contract. 
Interference with a prospective economic relationship 
contains specific safeguards that are not present in alienation 
of affections actions. The leading Utah case on intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations lists the 
elements of the tort as follows: " . . . in order to recover 
damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant 
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intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982) 
(emphasis added). The "improper purpose or improper means" 
test provides a critical safeguard that is lacking in 
alienation of affections actions. 
The "improper purpose" option turns on motive. For 
example, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant drove 
customers away from the plaintiff's business, the improper 
purpose test "will be satisfied where it can be shown that the 
actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307. On the other hand, if the 
defendant's purpose in alienating the plaintiff's customers was 
to gain those customers for the defendant's own business, that 
is a proper purpose which the law will allow. id. at 307-308. 
If the analogy with alienation of affections were valid, then 
alienating a spouse's affections for the purpose of gaining 
those affections to oneself, or for the purpose of helping that 
spouse (much as a consumer advocacy group can properly 
interfere with a business's prospective economic relationships 
by pointing out the defects in the business's products) should 
not constitute an improper purpose, and absent an improper 
means of employment, should not be tortious. 
In Leigh Furniture, the Court defined "improper means" 
as follows: 
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The alternative requirement of improper 
means is satisfied where the means used to 
interfere with a party's economic relations 
are contrary to law, such as violations of 
statutes, regulations, or recognized 
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or 
tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 
'improper' means of interference unless 
those means consist of constitutionally 
protected activity, like the exercise of 
First Amendment rights. 'Commonly included 
among improper means are violence, threats 
or other intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded 
litigation, defamation, or disparaging 
falsehood.' Means may also be improper or 
wrongful because they violate 'an 
established standard of trade or profession.' 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308 (citations omitted). Justice 
Stewart argued in Nelson that an "improper means" test based on 
the existence of "power relationships" should be adopted: 
There are those in special positions of 
power, status or authority who may illicitly 
use sex to satisfy their own passions or for 
otherwise improper means. There are any 
number of such relationships, i.e., 
professors and students; physicians and 
patients; psychiatrists, psychoanalysts or 
psychologists and clients; and employers and 
employees. Those who use positions of power 
or authority for the purpose of obtaining 
sexual favors and produce an alienation of 
affections between the one in an inferior 
position and his or her spouse, abuse and 
overreach any legitimate power they may have. 
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1222 (Stewart, Justice, concurring and 
dissenting). His suggestion was, however, rejected by the 
majority in Nelson.1 Because alienation of affections actions 
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lack the important safeguard of an "improper purpose/improper 
means" test, an analogy between that tort and the tort of 
interference with a prospective economic relationship is 
inaccurate. 
F. Alienation of affections actions do not 
deter the conduct they proscribe. 
When the Idaho Supreme Court abolished that state's 
cause of action for alienation of affections, it noted that 
"[n]ever has there been any documentation that the existence of 
the action actually protects marriages." O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 
112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (1986). Indeed, the Court can 
take judicial notice of the fact that divorce rates have 
increased significantly in Utah since the leading alienation of 
affections decision of Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 
759 (1954). 
An alienation of affections suit is unlikely to save 
the specific marriage at issue. As the O'Neil court points 
out, "once suit has been brought, it notifies the public that 
the marriage is unstable, embarrasses the spouses and their 
children, and adds more tension to the family relationship." 
O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698. 
Likewise, there is no reason to believe that the 
existence of alienation of affections actions currently serves 
any societal purpose in discouraging third party interferences 
with marital relationships. Such a deterrent effect is highly 
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unlikely for three reasons. First, there are very few 
alienation of affections lawsuits. Indeed, this Court has not 
upheld an award of damages in an alienation of affections 
lawsuit since the 1950fs. (The verdict in Nelson was set 
aside, and the case remanded for a new trial, on other 
grounds. 669 P.2d at 1220.) There are undoubtedly an 
extremely large number of individuals in this state who could 
be sued for alienation of affections. The very low ratio of 
lawsuits brought to potential lawsuits in existence serves to 
nullify any deterrent effect the tort might have. 
The second reason the tort lacks a deterrent effect is 
the very limited public awareness of the tort. Most people 
know that you can be sued for negligence, or for breaching a 
contract. The archaic tort of alienation of affections, 
however, is probably not well known to the public at large, and 
perhaps to the bar. 
The third reason for the lack of a deterrent effect 
has to do with human nature. Potential future alienation of 
affections defendants rarely act in a coldly rational way. 
Usually they don't do a legal analysis of their proposed 
actions; rather they tend to operate on an emotional plane. 
"The unplanned nature of the tort, at least where sexual 
activities are involved, makes the threat of any damage suit 
unlikely to deter the culpable conduct that has allegedly 
interfered with the marriage." O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698. 
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A new decision by this court affirming the existence 
of the tort is unlikely to increase its deterrent effect. 
Admittedly, the number of alienation of affections lawsuits 
could skyrocket. After two recent decisions reinforce the 
legitimacy of the tort, it could be legal malpractice for a 
lawyer to fail to discuss the possibility of an alienation of 
affections lawsuit in any divorce case where a third party's 
actions may have contributed to the dissolution of the 
marriage. There were some 8,985 divorces in Utah in 1987 
(according to John Brockert, Director, Bureau of Health 
Statistics, Utah Department of Health), and undoubtedly a large 
percentage of those divorces involved intentional interference 
of some sort by a third party in the marriage, so it is not 
illogical to assume that thousands of new lawsuits could result 
from a decision affirming the tort's viability. 
Likewise, it is fair to assume that the existence of 
large numbers of alienation of affections suits, coupled with 
media attention, could result in greater public awareness of 
the tort's existence. 
Reaffirmation of the tort will not create a meaningful 
deterrent effect, however, because the third obstacle to 
creating such an effect, human nature, will not be changed by 
this court's decision. People have been interfering in other 
people's marriages since the concept of marriage was first 
created. Undoubtedly, ancient Samaritans told in-law jokes, 
and sexual infidelity certainly predates the Bible. Throughout 
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the ages, societies have used any number of punishments, 
including death, in attempts to deter such interference, but 
without avail. There is no reason to believe that even an 
active and vital tort of alienation of affection will succeed 
in overcoming human nature, 
G. The practical problems associated with 
alienation of affections actions argue 
strongly for the tort's abolition. 
The most important practical problem with alienation 
of affections is establishing a meaningful measure of damages. 
The majority opinion in Nelson states that "the injury in this 
action seems no more 'intangible* and no more difficult to 
value than pain and suffering in a personal injury action or 
the loss of comfort, society, and companionship in an action 
for wrongful death." Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1217. Appellant 
respectfully disagrees with that assertion, and submits that it 
is subject to examination. 
"Pain and suffering" damages are measured from a 
common point of reference, a baseline of being free from pain 
that jurors can all agree upon. The duration of the pain is 
usually clearly established by the defendant's own testimony or 
by expert testimony. The degree of pain, although subjective, 
can at least be placed in a hierarchy of common human 
experience with pain that does not depend on the individual 
juror's value system, sense of morality, or religious beliefs. 
A broken leg, for instance, is generally more painful than a 
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minor skin laceration. A jury, therefore, can usually 
determine if an individual has suffered pain, the duration of 
that pain, and can make a least a hierarchical estimate of the 
degree of that pain relative to other kinds of pain. 
By contrast, in an alienation of affections case, the 
jury must start by making a guess as to the quality of the 
marriage before the defendant's actions, then must determine 
the quality of the marriage after those actions, and then must 
determine how much of the decline in the quality of the 
marriage, if any, is properly attributable to the defendant's 
actions. (Rarely in pain and suffering cases is the plaintiff 
responsible for the infliction of a portion of the pain.) What 
constitutes a "good marriage," or damage to a marriage, is 
highly personal and subjective; it depends on each juror's 
unique religious and moral value system, unlike the question of 
what constitutes not being in pain. Likewise, while most 
personal injury victims are in a relatively pain free condition 
before the injury is inflicted, most marriages are far from 
perfect at the point at which a third party's interference has 
any effect on the marriage relationship. 
The analogy between measuring damages in wrongful 
death actions and in alienation of affections suits, while much 
closer than the analogy to "pain and suffering" damages, is 
still flawed. This Court would have to allow the continued 
existence of wrongful death actions even if it were convinced 
that the damages awarded in those cases were essentially guess 
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work, because the cause of action for wrongful death is 
constitutionally mandated under Utah law. Utah Const. Art. 
XVI, § 5. Also, the mere fact that wrongful death cases deal 
with death makes the damages in those cases easier to 
calculate. Most importantly, there is no allegation in the 
typical wrongful death case that the plaintiff had something to 
do with the loss of consortium or that the spouse would have 
been "alienated" anyway; the loss of consortium is both final 
and totally causally related to the defendant's alleged wrong 
doings. 
Another practical problem associated with the tort of 
alienation of affections is the potential for blackmail. The 
prospective plaintiff can easily demand a "settlement" from the 
prospective defendant in order to prevent the plaintiff from 
making public allegations. The unusually high susceptibility 
of alienation of affections actions to blackmail is well 
recognized. See, Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1227 (Durham Justice, 
concurring and dissenting); O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698. 
Another problem with alienation of affections actions 
is that they are often brought for the improper purpose of 
indirectly attacking the "alienated spouse," rather than, or in 
addition to, "getting even" with the defendant. "The primary 
motive in bringing the action is often for the plaintiff to 
vindicate himself and gain revenge on the other spouse and the 
defendant." O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698. Allowing such indirect 
attacks on the "alienated spouse's" exercise of free will 
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further erodes that person's individual rights and identity. 
In many cases, the "alienated spouse" and the defendant have 
subsequently established a perfectly legal relationship. 
Alienation of affections in such circumstances is little more 
than a judicially enforceable tool to allow the plaintiff to 
interfere with the new and successful relationship under the 
guise of seeking damages for the harm done to the old, failed 
relationship. 
Taken individually, the problems with proving damages, 
the blackmail potential of alienation of affections suits, or 
the tendency of such suits to be used for improper purposes may 
not warrant abolition of the tort. Likewise, other practical 
difficulties with the tort, such as the possibility of 
collusive lawsuits, and the conflict between alienation of 
affections and the right to privacy, probably do not 
individually warrant abolition of the tort. Indeed, the 
majority opinion in Nelson considered most of the foregoing 
arguments and individually dismissed each argument. Nelson, 
669 P.2d at 1215-1218. Taken collectively, however, the 
arguments make a strong case for the abolition of alienation of 
affections. That is particularly true in light of the weak, 
almost non-existent, rationalizations put forward in favor of 
the tort's continued vitality. There comes a point at which a 
potential cause of action has so many problems associated with 
it that it should not exist, notwithstanding that each problem 
individually might be surmounted or ignored were it the only 
problem with the tort. 
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H. Across the nation, the law has increasingly 
come to reject alienation of affections as a 
cause of action. 
Given the serious problems with the tort, it is not 
surprising that state legislatures, state courts, and legal 
scholars have increasingly come to reject alienation of 
affections. 
A comparison of the fourth edition of William 
Prosser*s famous volume on the law of torts with the fifth 
edition gives a literal hornbook example of the change in legal 
thinking that occurred between 1971 and 1984. The fourth 
edition of Prosser's work, published in 1971, strongly 
questioned the desirability of abolishing alienation of 
affections, criminal conversation, and seduction as torts. See 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 124 (4th ed. 1971). 
The fifth edition, published in 1984, a year after 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, however, takes a decidedly different 
approach. In the exact spot where Prosser had previously 
criticized legislative abolition of alienation of affections, 
criminal conversation, and seduction, the fifth edition has 
replaced that language with the following quote: 
The trend against [alienation of affections 
and criminal conversation] actions has moved 
slowly, but in the light of increased 
personal emphasis in our society and 
personal choice, the de-criminalization of 
sexual activities in many states, and 
skepticism about the role of law in 
protecting feelings and enforcing highly 
personal morality, it seems doubtful that 
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the trend will be reversed. It is, however, 
possible to draw distinctions, and to 
provide relief where the interference with 
family relations is accomplished by means of 
some independent tort, such as fraud or 
defamation, or where the defendant has taken 
advantage of a person incapable of full 
consent, such as a child or an incompetent. 
It may well be that the accommodation of the 
conflicting ideals of personal freedom on 
the one hand and stable family life on the 
other will in the future be accommodated 
along these lines rather than by retaining 
the pure common law actions. 
W. Page Keeton, ed. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 
§ 124 (5th ed. 1984) (W. Prosser died in 1972). 
The change in mainstream legal thinking, away from the 
continued existence of alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation actions, is evident not only in the most recent 
edition of Prosser and Keeton on Torts, but also in recent law 
review writing. Since the Nelson opinion, both the University 
of Utah Law Review and the Brigham Young University Law Review 
have come out with articles that criticize the reasoning in 
Nelson and strongly attack the tort of alienation of affections 
itself. Note, Alienation of Affections, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 215 
(1985); C. Haws, Power Abuse as a Basis for Alienation of 
Affections: Nelson v. Jacobsen, 1985 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 183 
(1985). It is fair to say that the trend of recent legal 
commentators is distinctly against the continued existence of 
causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation. 
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A good hornbook is not so much a statement of what the 
author believes the law ought to be, as it is an analysis of 
what the law is and where the law is going. Viewed in that 
light, the change between the fourth and fifth edition of 
Prosser on Torts reflects the change in mainstream 
jurisprudential thinking between 1971 and 1984. For instance, 
in 1971, no court had judicially abolished alienation of 
affections actions, although Louisiana, because of its unique 
code law based legal system, had never recognized the action. 
See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927). 
Between 1980 and the publication of Prosser's fifth edition in 
1984, Iowa and Washington did judicially abolish the cause of 
action. Funderman v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981); 
Wvman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980). Since 
then, our sister state of Idaho, in the O'Neil decision, has 
joined the trend towards judicial abolition of alienation of 
affections. In addition, the majority of states and the 
District of Columbia have abolished alienation of affections by 
statute,2 or abolished such actions except for insignificant 
exceptions,3 or have limited such actions to injunctive relief.4 
All told then, alienation of affections actions for 
damages are not generally maintainable in at least thirty-five 
states. Utah should join the mainstream of American legal 
thinking, which increasingly favors abolition of this obsolete 
tort. 
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I. This Court's recent decision in Hackford v. 
Utah Power & Light Co. denying recovery for 
loss of consortium damages is in direct and 
irreconcilable conflict with the continued 
existence of alienation of affections 
actions. 
The principal elements of damages in an alienation of 
affections suit are loss of the alienated spouse's support, 
companionship, love and affection. Those types of damages have 
been recognized by this Supreme Court as falling under the 
rubrick of "loss of consortium damages." Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 
Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, 986 (1972). See also Black v. 
United States, 263 F. Supp. 470, 476 (D. Utah 1967). Numerous 
Utah Supreme Court cases recognize that the Married Woman's Act 
of 1898, Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4, which states in part that 
"[t]here shall be no right of recovery by the husband on 
account of personal injury or wrong to his wife", prohibits an 
action for loss of consortium damages (except in wrongful death 
cases where they are specifically authorized by Article XVI, 
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution). See e.g., Tias v. 
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1978); Ellis, 493 P.2d at 986; 
Black, 263 F. Supp. at 471-80 (federal court trying to 
determine state law before first Utah decision). Any doubt 
that may have existed about the issue was put to rest by this 
Court's recent decision in Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987). 
It is extremely difficult to see a theoretical 
justification for allowing loss of consortium damages in 
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alienation of affections actions, while not allowing them in 
other tort actions. Since 47 states recognize a loss of 
consortium action as a general principle of law, Hackford, 740 
P.2d at 1288 (Howe, J. concurring in the result), and since 
only a handful of states appear to have a viable cause of 
action for alienation of affections, Utah is probably unique in 
allowing the collection of loss of consortium damages in 
alienation actions, but not in normal tort actions. That 
anomalous result is simply unsupportable. See Hackford, 740 
P. 2d at 1293 (Durham and Stewart, JJ. dissenting). A 
plaintiff whose spouse was intentionally maimed and crippled by 
the defendant would have no cause of action for loss of 
consortium damages, while a plaintiff whose spouse had allowed 
or even encouraged an alienation of his or her affections "by" 
the defendant would be entitled to loss of consortium damages. 
Justice Zimmerman recognized the inequity in that 
situation in his majority opinion in Hackford, but apparently 
because the issue of the validity of a cause of action for 
alienation of affections was not before the court, he could do 
nothing to resolve the conflict. Justice Zimmerman's opinion 
did point out, however, that "[a]s for this Court's recognition 
of the alienation-of-affections cause of action in Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), its continued existence is 
a historical anomaly and should not be relied on to create new 
causes of action." Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1286 n.3. Now is the 
time for the Court to eliminate the "historical anomaly." 
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The 1987 Hackford case clearly illustrates both this 
Court's intention to disallow a general cause of action based 
on loss of consortium damages, and the conflict between that 
position and the continued viability of a cause of action for 
alienation of affections. To allow a claim for alienation of 
affections based on loss of consortium damages, while such a 
claim is unequivocally denied to all other tort claimants 
(except in wrongful death actions, pursuant to the Utah 
constitutional provision) would be highly inequitable. 
Justice Howe, in his concurring opinion in Hackford, 
distinguished loss of consortium from alienation of affections 
actions as follows: 
The comparison made by the plaintiff between 
an action for loss of consortium and an 
action for wrongful death or for alienation 
of affections is unavailing. Actions for 
wrongful death are protected by the Utah 
Constitution, art. XVI, § 5, and were 
unaffected by the legislative enaction of 
§ 30-2-4. Actions for alienation of 
affections are not derivative from a tort 
committed on the alienated spouse. The 
latter is not injured at all. Rather, 
alienation of affections arises from a tort 
committed on the non-alienated spouse by 
interference with his or her marriage 
contract. An action by a husband for 
alienation of affections such as Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), can in 
no wise be said to be brought "on account of 
personal injury or wrong to his wife," as 
prohibited by § 30-2-4. 
Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1287 (Howe, J., concurring in the result) 
That argument is based on a questionable premise, 
namely that the "alienated spouse" is never injured at all. 
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There are undoubtedly many occasions on which the "alienated 
spouse" is not injured, or has even benefited by being 
"alienated." On the other hand, that is not always the case. 
Sometimes the "alienated spouse" is an unwilling participant in 
the events causing the alienation. An example would be the 
type of situation discussed by Justice Stewart in his Nelson 
opinion, where a person in a position of power uses that power 
to make sexual advances and obtain sexual favors from an 
unwilling victim. Likewise, there are many situations where 
the spouse may have been a voluntary and even enthusiastic 
participant in the actions causing an alienation, but 
subsequently came to regret his or her actions and the damage 
that those actions had on his or her marriage. 
Even if the "alienated spouse" were never injured, it 
does not follow that the lack of such an injury should affect 
the plaintiffs right to recover damages. There is no logical 
reason why the plaintiffs ability to recover damages for the 
loss of support, companionship, love and affection of the 
plaintiffs spouse (who actually suffers the physical injury or 
alienation) should turn on whether the plaintiff's spouse was 
herself injured. See Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1291 (Durham J., 
dissenting) (action for loss of consortium, although nominally 
derivative, is actually an action for direct harm to the 
plaintiff). Justice Howe's argument would be analogous to 
saying that the right of a passenger in a vehicle to recover 
for damages caused in an accident is dependent on whether the 
driver of the vehicle was able to escape injury. 
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Under Utah law, loss of consortium damages should be 
denied pursuant to Hackford regardless of whether the 
plaintiff's spouse withheld support, companionship, love and 
affection from the plaintiff due to having been physically 
injured by the defendant or due to the defendant's alienating 
that spouse's affections. It would be a sad irony if the 
Married Woman's Act, which was designed to give wives legal 
independence, was held to bar loss of consortium actions, but 
not alienation of affections actions arising from a wife's 
exercise of her free will. 
II. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD JOIN THE MAINSTREAM 
OF AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT 
OF CRIMINAL CONVERSATION, A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT 
IS EVEN MORE SUBJECT TO ABUSE AND TO YIELDING 
IRRATIONAL RESULTS THAN ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. 
A. The tort of criminal conversation has only 
been recognized once under Utah law, in the 
1959 case of Cahoon v. Pelton. 
The Utah Supreme Court has only once analyzed the 
question of whether a cause of action should exist in Utah for 
the tort of criminal conversation. In Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 
2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), the court recognized the existence 
of a cause of action, based on the existence of the tort at 
English common law, although the English tort had been 
abolished long before Utah gained statehood and, in any event, 
was based on the antiquated notion that a husband had a 
property right in his wife. The Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged that that notion "is contrary to the law on that 
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subject as developed in this state and most, if not all, of the 
states in this country." Id., 342 P.2d at 98. Even so, this 
Court affirmed the cause of action. Ld. In so doing, the 
court created a new basis for the tort, namely "the exclusive 
right of either spouse to intercourse with the other." Id. 
Criminal conversation actions are entirely a judicial 
creation in Utah. Like alienation of affections actions, 
criminal conversation actions are without any constitutional or 
legislative support. As a creature of the common law, the tort 
of criminal conversation can be abolished by this Court if it 
deems it advisable to do so. 
B. The main public policy arguments against 
alienation of affections apply egually well 
to the tort of criminal conversation. 
The tort of criminal conversation suffers from the 
same theoretical and practical weaknesses as the tort of 
alienation of affections. For example, criminal conversation 
certainly provides at least as much opportunity for blackmail 
and improperly motivated suits as does alienation of 
affections. Moreover, it is even harder to measure damages in 
a criminal conversation case than in an alienation of 
affections case because discernable damage to the marriage is 
not a requirement of the former tort. The jury in effect must 
guess at the value of the plaintiff's hurt feelings caused by 
knowing that his or her spouse had engaged in sexual relations 
with defendant. Otherwise, the measure of damages in the two 
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actions is basically identical. As a result, criminal 
conversation actions are as inconsistent with the Hackford rule 
barring loss of consortium damages as are alienation of 
affections actions. The primary differences between alienation 
of affections and criminal conversation are twofold. First, 
sexual conduct is a prerequisite to a criminal conversation 
action. Second, criminal conversation has even fewer 
safeguards than alienation of affections. 
C. The lack of recognized defenses makes 
criminal conversation actions more subject 
to abuse and absurd results than alienation 
of affections actions. 
The elements of the tort of criminal conversation, as 
defined in Cahoon, appear to border on strict liability. All 
that is required for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie 
case is proof that the defendant engaged in "adultery in 
violation of the criminal law" with the plaintiff's spouse. 
Id., 342 P.2d at 98-99. It is arguably no defense that the 
"guilty spouse" consented or even enticed the defendant. Id., 
342 P.2d at 98. Indeed, few defenses to criminal conversation 
exist except for a defense based on the consent of the 
plaintiff to the act. 
It is precisely the irrational and inequitable strict 
liability nature of this tort that has caused it to be even 
more disfavored among courts and commentators than alienation 
of affections. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, for 
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example, recently abolished the tort of criminal conversation, 
even though it apparently retains a cause of action for 
alienation of affections, when it found itself in the absurd 
situation of otherwise having to uphold a verdict for criminal 
conversation against a wife based on her sleeping with her 
husband. 
In Joan Feldman v. Darlene Feldman, 125 N.H. 102, 480 
A.2d 34 (1984), both the plaintiff and the defendant were 
unwittingly married to the same husband. The husband had 
married the plaintiff in 1962 in New Hampshire and had fathered 
three children with her. His job required extensive travel and 
he was rarely at home in New Hampshire. He met the defendant 
in Tokyo in 1970; he told her that he was divorced. After a 
period of courtship, he married the defendant in 1973, 
established his home with her in Las Vegas, and had a son by 
her in 1976. All the time, the husband maintained his 
relationship with his first wife and family, and neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant knew of the other one's existence. 
The plaintiff learned of her husband's marriage to the 
defendant in 1981. She divorced him, and brought an action for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation against the 
defendant shortly thereafter. The trier of fact (a master) 
found in favor of the defendant on the alienation of affections 
claim. The master determined that the defendant was entirely 
innocent of any intent to alienate the mutual husband's 
affections from the plaintiff, whom she did not know existed. 
-41-
The master found, however, that the plaintiff in a criminal 
conversation action "need only prove an occurrence of sexual 
intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse, 
and that the only possible defense for the action is consent or 
condonation by the plaintiff." Feldman, 480 A.2d at 35. He 
therefore awarded $35,000 in damages to the plaintiff. 
In reviewing the case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
agreed that the trier of fact had correctly interpreted and 
applied the law of criminal conversation to the case. I_d. The 
court disagreed, however, with the fact finder's opinion that 
abolishing the tort of criminal conversation was a "legislative 
function." The court determined that it had the authority to 
abolish the tort of criminal conversation: 
As a common-law tort, the action for 
criminal conversation is a creation of the 
judiciary. Consequently, it is the duty of 
the judiciary to examine it and make such 
changes as justice requires when the 
Legislature has chosen not to act. The 
Legislature expressed its will by enacting 
laws, not by failing to do so. Furthermore, 
its inaction could be motivated by its 
assumption that if a judicial developed rule 
is unjust, the courts will overrule it. It 
follows that the general rule of deference 
to the legislative intent has no application 
here, where the Legislature has expressed no 
intent that the cause of action be retained. 
Id., 480 A.2d at 35 (quotations and citations omitted). The 
New Hampshire Supreme Court thereupon abolished the cause of 
action for criminal conversation, after noting that a solid 
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majority of the states and the District of Columbia had already 
done likewise. Id, 480 A.2d at 35-36. 
D. Mainstream American legal opinion is even 
more opposed to criminal conversation 
actions than to alienation of affections 
actions. 
Not surprisingly, in light of the absurd results that 
the tort can produce, courts are even more willing to abolish 
criminal conversation on their own initiative than they are to 
abolish alienation of affections. All told, seven states have 
done so. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Kline 
v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Feldman v. 
Feldman, 125 N.H. 102, 480 A.2d 34 (1984); Lynn v. Shaw, 620 
P.2d 899 (Okla. 1980); Fadqen v. Lenker, 365 A.2d 147 (Pa. 
1976); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981); Erwin v. 
Coluccio, 32 Wash. App. 510, 648 P.2d 458 (1982). In addition, 
Louisiana long ago refused to recognize the tort, Moulin v. 
Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447, 448-49 (1927), and the 
recent O'Neil opinion in Idaho discussed above in connection 
with alienation of affections leaves no doubt that Idaho would 
join the ranks of those states that prohibit the cause of 
action if it were called upon to do so. 
This move to judicially abolish criminal conversation 
is relatively new. Of the nine states discussed above, all 
except Louisiana have acted since 1976, at least 17 years after 
the Utah Supreme Court's sole analysis of criminal conversation 
in Cahoon. 
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Legislatures also take a dim view of criminal 
conversation actions. Many states have legislatively abolished 
the tort,5 while other states have eliminated the right to 
collect money damages.^ 
Even commentators who strongly support the continued 
existence of a cause of action for alienation of affections 
believe that the tort of criminal conversation ought to be 
abolished. For instance, one particular article, The Case for 
Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with 
the Marital Relationship, 48 Notre Dame Lawyer 426 (1972), was 
obviously highly persuasive to the Utah Supreme Court majority 
in Nelson v. Jacobsen. It is quoted or cited in the majority 
opinion at least four times in support of four different 
arguments favoring the retention of a cause of action for 
alienation of affections. Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1215, 1216, 
1217, and 1218. Yet with regard to criminal conversation, the 
article's author makes the following condemnation: 
There is growing evidence that extramarital 
sexual activity is becoming not only more 
common but more acceptable, apparently even 
to the partners to the marriage. In this 
state of affairs the action for criminal 
conversation as it now stands is largely 
outdated. As has been indicated the 
defendant's ignorance of the marriage does 
not constitute a defense against the charge 
of adultery; nor does proof that the 
faithless spouse encouraged the adulterous 
act. To allow recovery on the basis of the 
sexual conduct alone without proof of a 
resulting diminution of affections or 
similar loss would leave the door open to 
flagrant injustices. In other words, the 
-44-
right of the spouse flowing from the marital 
relationship would no longer be conclusively 
presumed to include a monopoly interest in 
his or her partner's sexual intercourse. 
48 Notre Dame Lawyer at 433 (the validity of the author's 
position is confirmed by the absolute lack of enforcement of 
Utah's adultery law, which some might suggest remains on the 
books only because the Utah Legislature does not want to appear 
to be encouraging extra-marital relationships by repealing 
it). Thus, even conservative commentators who favor retention 
of alienation of affections actions deny the continued 
viability of the rationale that the Utah Supreme Court used 
thirty years ago in recognizing a cause of action for criminal 
conversation. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, alienation of affections is an obsolete 
tort. It is based on the archaic assumption that wives are 
their husband's property, unable to exercise their own free 
will, and that husbands have a legal right to the continued 
affection of another human being. By contrast, under current 
Utah law a husband does not even have the right to the 
continuation of his marriage, much less the affections of his 
spouse. Alienation of affections actions are fraught with 
practical problems. Further, an action for alienation of 
affections is basically an action for loss of consortium; Utah 
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law does not allow loss of consortium damages for any other 
tort (except for constitutionally mandated damages in wrongful 
death cases). As a matter of fairness, and in recognition of 
the need for change and growth in the common law, Utah ought to 
abolish the cause of action for alienation of affections. 
Likewise, criminal conversation is no longer a viable 
tort. It is subject to gross abuse and can lead to real 
injustices. In the three decades that have passed since Utah's 
only decision on the matter, legislatures, courts and 
commentators (including one recently relied on by the Utah 
Supreme Court in retaining alienation of affections) have 
become increasingly hostile to what is perceived as an unjust 
and inequitable strict liability tort. It is now time for Utah 
to join the growing ranks of states that have abolished this 
outmoded cause of action. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the defendant, J. 
Ralph Macfarlane, appeals to this Supreme Court for a decision 
declaring that alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation are no longer recognizable torts under Utah law, 
and reversing Judge Roth's order denying the defendant's 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
Upon Which Relief may be Granted. 
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ENDNOTES 
1
 One weakness in Justice Stewart's "power 
relationship" argument is that it does not explain why a cause 
of action should lie in the spouse of the victim of a power 
relationship. Unwanted sexual advances by an employer are 
unquestionably illegal; unwanted sexual advances by professors, 
physicians, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts or psychologists are 
serious violations of professional ethics that can lead to a 
loss of credentials, and such advances are usually inherently 
tortious under various theories. In each case a cause of 
action or remedy other than alienation of affections is 
available to the recipient of the advances. Of course, if an 
intimate relationship develops between a person in authority 
and an underling as a result of mutual attractions, that 
situation is really no different from any ordinary alienation 
of affections action, of the type that Justice Stewart 
apparently would have abolished in Nelson. For a further 
critique of the "power relationship" approach, see C. Haws, 
Power Abuse as a Basis for Alienation of Affections: Nelson v 
Jabobsen, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 183 (1985). 
2
 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-341 (Supp. 1988); Cal. 
Civ. Code § 43.5 (West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-202 
(1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572b (1987); D.C. Code Ann. 
§ 16-923 (1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-17 (1982); Ind. Code Ann. 
§ 34-4-4-1 (Burns 1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 167 
(1981); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-301(a)(1984) ; Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, § 47B (West Supp. 1988); Mich. Stat. 
Ann. § 27A.2901 (1988); Minn. Stat. § 553.02 (1988); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 27-1-601 (1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,188 (Supp. 
1988); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.380 (1986); N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 14-02-06 (Supp. 1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.840 (1987); Tex. 
Fam. Code Ann. § 4.06 (Supp. 1989); Va. Code § 8.01-220 (1950); 
W. Va. Code § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 768.01 
(1981). 
3
 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West 1987) 
(action permitted only if spouse was a minor or incompetent at 
time of alleged alienation); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, § 170 
(Purdon 1965) (action permitted only if defendant is blood 
relative of plaintiff). 
4
 Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975) (injunction permitted, 
see, Logan v. Davidson, 282 Ala. 327, 330, 211 So.2d 461, 463 
(1968)); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974) (abolished cause 
of action for "sums of money as damages"); Fla. Stat. § 771.01 
(1986) (abolished "sums of money as damages"); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 460:2 (1983) (prohibits civil actions for damages, but 
see 125 N.H. 102, 480 A.2d 34 (1984) which effectively 
abolished the cause of action); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A-.23-1 
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(1987) (abolished action for sums of money); N.Y. Civ. Rights 
Law § 80-a (McKinney 1976) (abolished action for sums of 
money); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29 (Page 1981) (Abolished 
action for civil damages); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1001 
(Supp. 1988) (abolished actions for sums of money); Wyo. Stat. 
§ 1-23-101 (1988) (abolished action for monetary damages). 
5
 Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975); Cal. Civ. Code § 43.5 
(West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-202 (1987); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 52-572f (1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-923 (1981); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 51-1-17 (1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns 
1986); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, § 47B (West Supp. 1988); 
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2901 (1988); Minn. Stat. § 553.02 
(1988); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,188 (Supp. 1988); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 41.380 (1986); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-06 (Supp. 1987); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.850 (1981); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.05 
(Supp. 1989); Va. Code § 8.01-220 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 768.01 (1981). 
6
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); Fla. Stat. 
§ 771.01 (1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23-1 (1987); N.Y. Civ. 
Rights Law § 80-a(McKinney 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29 
(Page 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1988); Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-23-101 (1988). 
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